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Establish a national defence framework to prepare, invest, and integrate drones for modern warfare based on Ukraine conflict lessons.

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ENTRY ID: SCALE-DRONE-001
Date added: 10/07/2026
Entry status: [ ] Draft [ ] Under review [x] Published
Submitted by: GSTIA Library Team
LLM: DeepSeek-R1

1. Solution Title

Establish a national defence framework to prepare, invest, and integrate drones for modern warfare based on Ukraine conflict lessons.

2. Step-by-Step Implementation Guide

This guide outlines a sequenced, multi-year strategy for a national government to fundamentally reform its defence structure, procurement, and doctrine to prepare for drone-dominated warfare, drawing on the lessons of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and analysis from experts Mick Ryan, Jack Watling, and Franz-Stefan Gady.

Step 1 – Conduct a National Defence Audit and Gap Analysis

  • Action: Commission an independent, cross-agency review (via the defence ministry, military leadership, intelligence community, and an external panel of experts) to conduct a comprehensive assessment of national defence capabilities against the threat of drone-dominated warfare.
  • Responsible Actor: Ministry of Defence / Joint Chiefs of Staff / National Security Council.
  • Completion Looks Like: A published report that:
    • Assesses current drone and counter-drone capabilities, noting that Australia has the same number of drone units today as it did before the war in Ukraine started, and that current focus is on “extraordinarily expensive, exquisite, small batches of drones” rather than mass deployable systems .
    • Evaluates the defence procurement process and industrial capacity, identifying barriers to rapid adaptation .
    • Assesses military doctrine and training against the lessons of Ukraine, where both sides are building around 1-2 million drones a year each .
    • Maps vulnerabilities to drone attacks, including against critical infrastructure, military installations, and population centres.
    • Recommends urgent reforms to procurement, doctrine, and force structure.

Step 2 – Reform Defence Procurement to Enable Rapid Adaptation

  • Action: Overhaul defence procurement processes to enable rapid acquisition, iteration, and deployment of drone and counter-drone systems, moving from decade-long cycles to weeks or months.
  • Responsible Actor: Ministry of Defence / Ministry of Finance / Parliament.
  • Completion Looks Like:
    • Procurement timelines reduced from decades to months, recognising that “speed is the new stealth” and that drone technology is dating quicker than fast fashion .
    • Acceptance of failure and learning as part of the process, moving from a “low-to-zero-risk organisation” to one that tolerates failure if lessons are learned .
    • Establishment of close links between military units and defence industry, enabling bottom-up feedback and rapid iteration, recognising that innovation in Ukraine happens “from one week to three months” .
    • Prioritisation of mass, low-cost systems over “exquisite, small batches” of high-end drones, recognising that both Ukraine and Russia are building 1-2 million drones a year each .
    • Investment in sovereign supply chains for drone components, recognising that 90% of the world’s magnets are controlled by China and there is no magnet recycling programme .

Step 3 – Establish a National “Drone Force” with Dedicated Uncrewed Systems Brigades

  • Action: Create dedicated uncrewed systems brigades and regiments within the armed forces, following the Ukrainian model of dedicated UAV regiments and non-standard brigades pioneering novel equipment .
  • Responsible Actor: Ministry of Defence / Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  • Completion Looks Like:
    • Establishment of 2-3 dedicated uncrewed systems brigades, with a mix of air and ground drones, recognising that Ukraine’s experience shows the need for “true robot military” with mutually supporting robotic systems .
    • Integration of drone units at every level (brigade, battalion, company), not just as specialised units.
    • Development of a “zone-based” operational concept, recognising that the battlefield is now conceptualised in terms of a contested zone (0-15km), middle zone (15-30km), and deep zone (30km+), each requiring different drone capabilities .
    • Investment in both aerial and ground drones, recognising that Ukraine uses UGVs disproportionately for resupply and for sustained fire from outside prepared positions .
    • Development of interceptor drone capabilities, with Ukraine now deploying AI-assisted interceptors that can significantly shorten detection and tracking times .

Step 4 – Invest in AI-Enabled Autonomous and Semi-Autonomous Systems

  • Action: Massively accelerate investment in AI-enabled autonomous and semi-autonomous systems for targeting, interception, and decision support.
  • Responsible Actor: Ministry of Defence / Ministry of Research and Innovation / Defence Industry.
  • Completion Looks Like:
    • Development of AI-assisted targeting systems that can automate up to 95% of the interception process, with the human operator authorising engagement .
    • Investment in terminal guidance systems, where a weapon locks onto a target in its final approach and completes its strike without further human intervention .
    • Development of AI systems for sensor data filtering, which can weed out up to half of false targets .
    • Integration of AI into command and control systems, enabling rapid decision-making and coordination of human-robot teams .
    • Investment in AI systems trained on vast wartime data, recognising that Ukraine has accumulated immense troves of data that can train AI systems for object recognition, targeting, and interception .

Step 5 – Invest in Counter-Drone and Electronic Warfare Capabilities

  • Action: Build layered counter-drone and electronic warfare capabilities to defend against mass drone attacks.
  • Responsible Actor: Ministry of Defence / Air Force / Army.
  • Completion Looks Like:
    • Layered air defence against drones, including:
      • Cheap interceptor drones for low-cost Shahed-type threats, noting that a Shahed costs perhaps $35,000 each while a Patriot PAC-3 missile costs millions and the United States can only make several hundred a year .
      • Electronic warfare systems to jam and spoof drones, noting that fibre-optic controlled drones are impossible to jam and harder to detect .
      • Mobile fire units equipped with anti-aircraft machineguns with thermal imagers and tablet computers .
      • Acoustic sensor networks to fill blind spots in radar coverage .
    • Investment in counter-drone teams that deploy sensors, intercept, and command teams, as Ukraine has done .
    • Development of counter-adaptation measures for interceptor teams, recognising that Russia has adapted by flying drones at higher altitudes, painting them to be harder to spot, and taking rapid evasive manoeuvres .
    • Investment in systems to detect and counter fibre-optic controlled drones.

Step 6 – Transform Force Structure for Drone-Dominated Warfare

  • Action: Restructure the armed forces for drone-dominated warfare, with smaller, more dispersed units, more command-and-control authority at lower levels, and integration of uncrewed systems.
  • Responsible Actor: Ministry of Defence / Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  • Completion Looks Like:
    • Restructuring of combat teams to be smaller and more nimble, with command-and-control authority pushed down to brigade level, as Watling recommends .
    • Investment in modular equipment that can be quickly swapped out .
    • Development of infantry tactics adapted to drone saturation, recognising that infantry still holds ground and is more important than ever, even as drones dominate .
    • Establishment of a “human-robot team” force structure, with one pilot overseeing multiple missions instead of just one at a time .
    • Development of “recce strike at every level” capability, balancing the need to strike high-value targets against the risk of detection .

Step 7 – Invest in Leadership, Training, and Adaptive Culture

  • Action: Reform military leadership development and training to foster leaders who can learn through failure, adapt quickly, and lead human-robot teams.
  • Responsible Actor: Ministry of Defence / Defence Academy / War Colleges.
  • Completion Looks Like:
    • Curriculum reform at war colleges to include drone warfare, AI, and human-robot teaming .
    • Development of training programmes that foster adaptive leadership and learning through failure .
    • Creation of feedback loops between frontline units and training institutions, enabling rapid dissemination of lessons learned .
    • Investment in “intellectual battles” that develop new ideas, doctrines, technologies, and organisations to respond to rapid technological change .

Step 8 – Build National Industrial Capacity for Drone Production

  • Action: Invest in national industrial capacity to produce drones, munitions, and counter-drone systems at scale in times of crisis.
  • Responsible Actor: Ministry of Defence / Ministry of Industry / Prime Minister’s Office.
  • Completion Looks Like:
    • Establishment of a national drone production programme, aiming for production capacity of hundreds of thousands of drones per year, recognising that both Ukraine and Russia are building around 1-2 million drones a year each .
    • Development of a decentralised production model, similar to Ukraine’s model where one maker uses wooden airframes manufactured the same way as flat pack furniture .
    • Investment in sovereign supply chains for critical components (motors, electronics, batteries), recognising dependence on China .
    • Establishment of close links between military units and drone makers, enabling rapid iteration and adaptation .
    • Creation of a national “drone innovation fund” to support start-ups and smaller companies .

Step 9 – Invest in Operational Depth Strike Capabilities

  • Action: Develop long-range drone strike capabilities to target enemy logistics, command posts, and infrastructure at operational depth (30-200km).
  • Responsible Actor: Ministry of Defence / Air Force / Army.
  • Completion Looks Like:
    • Investment in mid-range strike drones (30-200km) to target enemy logistics, command posts, and infrastructure, recognising that Ukraine has contracted a record number of mid-range strike systems and is pushing to expand the kill zone to 45-50km .
    • Development of long-range drone strike capabilities (200km+) to target strategic infrastructure, noting that Ukraine has achieved a 1,750km drone strike on a Russian oil refinery .
    • Investment in satellite-connected drones to strike deeper into enemy rear areas, bypassing electromagnetic warfare .
    • Development of AI-assisted targeting for deep strikes, reducing human input .

Step 10 – Establish a National Drone Warfare Research and Innovation Centre

  • Action: Create a national centre for drone warfare research, innovation, and experimentation, with links to academia, industry, and frontline units.
  • Responsible Actor: Ministry of Defence / Ministry of Research and Innovation / Universities.
  • Completion Looks Like:
    • Establishment of a national “Centre for Drone Warfare and Uncrewed Systems” with a multi-decade mandate.
    • Mandatory training for all defence personnel in drone warfare principles and counter-drone tactics.
    • Revision of defence curricula to include drone warfare, AI, and human-robot teaming.
    • A national fellowship programme to attract engineers, computer scientists, and military strategists into defence research.
    • Horizon scanning and experimentation to anticipate emerging threats and technologies .

3. Polycrisis Strand(s)

Primary strand: Governance, peace and conflict
Interaction effects with other strands:

  • Digital infrastructure and AI: Drone warfare is fundamentally enabled by AI, autonomous systems, and digital infrastructure, with AI now automating up to 95% of the interception process .
  • Industrial output: The scale of drone production requires industrial transformation, with both Ukraine and Russia building 1-2 million drones a year each .
  • Globalisation and finance: Defence procurement must be reformed to enable rapid adaptation, with “speed is the new stealth” .
  • Inequality: Access to drone technology is uneven, with the cost of a Shahed (35,000)comparedtoaPatriotmissile(35,000)comparedtoaPatriotmissile(millions) .
  • Energy and mineral resources: Drone production depends on critical minerals and components, with 90% of the world’s magnets controlled by China .

4. Scale Category

ScalePrimary?Enabling role?
IndividualYes
Family / HouseholdYes
Community / VillageYes
City / RegionYes
Nation StateYes
GlobalYes

Notes on scale interaction: “Requires a strong national-level framework to enable change at all lower scales. A single nation’s efforts may be undermined by global supply chain dependencies and the pace of international technological change, but national leadership is essential to demonstrate feasibility and build momentum.”

5. Dewey Decimal Classification

Primary DDC: 623.746 – Military aircraft and drones
Secondary DDC(s): 355.4 – Military tactics; 355.6 – Military procurement; 006.3 – Artificial intelligence; 355.03 – Military strategy; 355.4 – Warfare; 623.45 – Weapons and military engineering
Subject headings (LC or local): “Drone warfare”, “Unmanned aerial vehicles – military aspects”, “Military tactics”, “Defence procurement”, “Artificial intelligence – military applications”, “Electronic warfare”, “Military adaptation”, “Ukraine war – lessons learned”, “Robotics in warfare”

6. Regional Applicability

Evidenced implementations:

  • Ukraine: The primary case study, with rapid innovation in drone warfare, AI integration, and mass production .
  • Russia: A precedent for rapid scaling of drone production and adaptation .
  • United Kingdom (RUSI): Precedent for developing doctrine and force structure based on Ukraine lessons .
  • NATO: Emerging integration of Ukraine lessons into force planning .

Climatic/geographic scope: [ ] Tropical [ ] Temperate [ ] Arid [ ] Arctic/sub-arctic [ ] Coastal [x] All
Political economy prerequisites: “Requires a functioning state with rule of law, a relatively stable political system, and a defence establishment willing to undertake fundamental reform. Requires strong industrial capacity and links between military, industry, and academia.”

Contraindications: “May be difficult to implement in contexts with weak institutional capacity, highly centralised procurement, risk-averse culture, or heavy dependence on foreign suppliers. Opposition from entrenched procurement systems and traditional military branches is likely to be intense.”

7. Cost Estimate

Cost tierIndicative rangeBasis
Pilot / proof of concept£100 million – £500 millionCost of establishing the audit, research centre, and initial procurement reform.
Community-scale deploymentN/ANot applicable at this scale.
City/regional scaleN/ANot applicable at this scale.
National rollout£10 billion – £50 billion+Cost of full national drone force establishment, including procurement, industrial investment, and training.

Cost notes: “This is a national investment strategy, not a traditional ‘cost.’ The resources required are already in the defence budget but are currently directed towards traditional platforms. The transition will involve significant upfront investment but will generate long-term savings (reduced reliance on expensive platforms, avoided casualties). The cost of inaction (being unprepared for drone-dominated warfare) is estimated to be orders of magnitude higher.”

Funding mechanisms used in existing implementations: “Defence budgets redirected from traditional platforms, dedicated drone innovation funds, public-private partnerships, and procurement reform to enable rapid acquisition.”

8. Timescale Estimate

Time to initial implementation: 12-18 months (for the audit, procurement reform, and establishment of the research centre).
Time to measurable impact: 3-5 years (to see first effects on force structure, procurement, and training).
Time horizon of full benefit: 10-20 years (to transform the armed forces for drone-dominated warfare).
Short-term vs long-term tension note: “This is a generational project requiring political will to overcome short-term vested interests. The short term will involve significant investment and potential pushback from traditional military branches and procurement systems; the long-term benefit is avoiding a catastrophic mismatch between force structure and the realities of modern warfare. The ‘sacrifice’ is the budgets and influence of incumbent defence contractors and traditional platforms, not the security of the nation.”

9. Evidence Base

Primary source(s):

  • Ryan, M. (2025). “Dispatch from Ukraine: The adaptation battle intensifies.” Lowy Institute. 
  • Ryan, M. (2026). “Ret. Army major general Mick Ryan says Ukraine drone warfare to force reckoning for ‘slow, arrogant’ Australia.” The Nightly. 
  • Watling, J. (2025). “Ukraine isn’t just hurling attack drones; they’re waging real robot warfare.” Defense One. 
  • Watling, J. (2024). The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-first Century. Bloomsbury. 
  • Gady, F-S. (2026). “Krieg in der Ukraine: ‘Ich warne vor Überschwänglichkeit.’” Tagesschau. 
  • Gady, F-S. (2025). “Experte: Ukraine ‘entgleitet die Überlegenheit in der Drohnenkriegsführung.’” FOCUS online. 

Supporting source(s):

  • ABC News (2024). “Drone warfare in Ukraine has changed the way battles are fought.” 
  • Ukrinform (2026). “Deputy commander-in-chief of AFU: Battlefield future depends on full system integration and decision automation.” 
  • New York Times (2026). “How Ukraine Uses A.I. to Knock Deadly Russian Drones Out of the Skies.” 
  • CTC Sentinel (2025). “Shahed-Style One Way Attack Drones.” 
  • ASPI The Strategist (2026). “Beyond the front line: Ukraine is deepening its drone wall.” 
  • Militaire Spectator (2025). “The Arms of the Future” (book review). 
  • Army War College (2025). “Drones and the Changing Character of War.” 

Evidence quality: [x] Peer-reviewed [ ] Grey literature [x] Practitioner case study [x] Modelled projection
Known counter-evidence or limitations: “This is a systemic solution that is still emerging in policy practice. The evidence for individual components is strong (drone warfare lessons from Ukraine), but the integration of these lessons into national force structure, procurement, and doctrine is novel and untested at scale. The primary limitation is political: the dominance of traditional procurement systems, risk-averse culture, and resistance from vested interests in incumbent defence contractors and traditional platforms. The cooperation-over-conflict narrative for procurement reform may not hold in the face of institutional inertia.”

Supporting media (external links only):

Link verification date: 10/07/2026

10. Implementation Indicators

Output indicators:

  • Number of drone units established (brigade, battalion, company).
  • Number of drones procured and deployed (by type).
  • Number of counter-drone systems deployed.
  • Number of defence procurement reforms enacted.
  • Defence spending on drones and uncrewed systems as % of budget.
  • Number of defence personnel trained in drone warfare.
  • National drone production capacity (units per year).

Outcome indicators:

  • Ratio of drones to personnel (target: 1 drone per 1-10 personnel, moving towards parity) .
  • National drone and counter-drone capability relative to peer adversaries.
  • Military readiness for drone-dominated warfare.
  • Casualty rates in conflict scenarios (reduced by drone protection).
  • Operational depth strike capability (range and accuracy).
  • Force structure reform timeline.

Reporting mechanism: “An annual report to parliament by the National Audit Office, assessing the performance of the new drone force framework against the indicators above, and benchmarking against other nations and emerging threats.”

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